Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 47
Issue 4 October 2014

Article 4

2014

Anarchy, Order, and Trade: A Structuralist Account of Why a Global
Commercial Legal Order is Emerging
Bryan H. Druzin

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, and the Transnational Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Bryan H. Druzin, Anarchy, Order, and Trade: A Structuralist Account of Why a Global Commercial Legal
Order is Emerging, 47 Vanderbilt Law Review 1049 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol47/iss4/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Anarchy, Order, and Trade: A
Structuralist Account of Why a
Global Commercial Legal Order is
Emerging
Bryan H. Druzin*

ABSTRACT

While still fragmented, the world is witnessing the
emergence of a global commercial legal order independent of
any one national legal system. This process is unfolding both on
the macrolevel of state actors as well as on the microlevel of
private individuals and organizations. On the macrolevel, the
sources of this legal order are complex internationalagreements;
on the microlevel, private contracts employing commercial
customary practices and arbitration are driving this process
forward. Yet there is no comparable evolution occurring (in any
substantial sense) in noncommercial areas of law such as
criminal, tort, or family law. There is an overall asymmetry in
the development of transnational legal order. But why is this
occurring? This Article argues that the emergence of a global
commercial legal order may be partiallyattributed to the unique
structural nature of trade. The Article gives a structuralist
account, positing that, unlike legal order of a non-commercial
nature, commercial legal order has built-in mechanisms that
make it particularly suited to evolve in a transnational
context-that is, to evolve and sustain itself in the absence of a
central legislative or coercive authority. The Article identifies
and explores these built-in mechanisms. The Article concludes
that, because commercial legal order is uniquely predisposed to
emerge without the state, this asymmetry should not only
continue but likely grow even more extreme.

* Assistant Professor of Law, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. Special thanks
to Jan Dalhuisen at UC Berkeley and King's College London for his guidance in
formulating many of these concepts, and Bryan Mercurio and Julienne Chaisse at the
Chinese University of Hong Kong for their comments on earlier drafts.
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I. INTRODUCTION

There is something afoot in transnational law. It is becoming
increasingly obvious that there is a general asymmetry in its
development, with commercial legal structures converging at a faster
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rate than law of a non-commercial nature. While still fragmented and
exhibiting degrees of polycentrism, a global commercial legal order is
coming into focus.' This emergence is unfolding both on the
macrolevel of state actors as well as on the microlevel of private
individuals and organizations. On the macrolevel, the sources of this
legal order are complex international agreements; on the microlevel,
private contracts employing customary law and arbitration are
driving this process forward. This transnational legal order
represents a rich and growing body of jurisprudence functioning
under dispute settlement mechanisms that boast principles and rules
that are no longer restricted to specific spheres of influence but
actually entail elements of integration as trade law is being partly or
fully harmonized. 2 Yet law of a noncommercial nature has no
comparable evolution taking place (in any truly substantial sense) in
areas such as criminal, tort, or family law. 3 The question thus arises,

1.
The Article uses the term global commercial law or transnational
commercial law throughout. These are vague terms that need to be defined, They
should be understood in the following expansive sense: the legal order that arises in
relation to the formation of a contract between individual actors in a transnational
setting. Radiating outward from this core starting point, this definition includes not
only the contracts the parties themselves draw up but also legal structures such as the
rules of international arbitration and even, in its more general sense, international
trade law, such as the rules of multi-sovereign bodies. Thus, the term global
commercial legal order as it is used here is inclusive of both the most simple and, at the
same time, the most complex definitions of law dealing with transnational trade. It
concerns both the actions of individual merchants and the actions of nation-states as
well as the assortment of institutions that fall somewhere in between. For an excellent
comprehensive treatment on this emergence, see generally JAN H. DALHUISEN,
DALHUISEN ON TRANSNATIONAL COMPARATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL AND TRADE
LAW, INTRODUCTION-THE NEW LEX MERCATORL4 AND ITS SOURCES (5th ed. 2013)

(advancing a theory that international commercial law emanates from a legal order of
its own creation, rather than from states).
2.
This legal order evolved for many decades in isolation and was not wellembedded in the body of general international law. However, it has now flowered into
what may increasingly be called a global, commercial legal order comprised of
customary commercial practices, international arbitration, international investment
agreements, the rise of multisovereign bodies such as the World Trade Organization
(WTO), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and
regional economic integration such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) and NAFTA.
The global administrative law movement shows some nascent signs of a
3.
similar evolution; however, it is absolutely dwarfed by the transnational legal ordering
that is arising in connection to commerce. See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch &
Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP.

PROBS. 15, 15 (2005) (discussing the growth of a global system of administrative law
and the historic constraints on greater consensus in global administrative law
practice). But see Sabino Cassese, Administrative Law Without the State? The
Challenge of Global Regulation, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 663, 694 (2005) ("[T]he

large number of norms, the development of rules and principles, and the rise of courts
all confirm the high degree of institutionalization . . . of the global administrative
system.").
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what can account for this "edge" that commercial legal order seems to
have over its noncommercial counterparts?
This Article argues that part of the reason is simply structural in
nature. It is posited that the emergence of a global, commercial legal
order may be at least partially attributed to the unique character of
trade. Unlike legal order of a noncommercial nature, commercial legal
order has built-in mechanisms that render it particularly well-suited
to evolve in a transnational context. 4 As a result, commercial legal
order has the ability-and, in fact, the tendency-to run ahead of the
State and evolve, grow, and sustain itself quite robustly in a
transregional context.5 Of course, this evolution is multifaceted and
complex; clearly, there are other factors that are contributing to this
emergence. However, what theorists miss is the unique structural
nature of trade that gives commercial legal ordering a fundamental
edge over its noncommercial counterpart. The structuralist account
offered here is not put forward as the sole and universal explanation
for this emergence. 6 Indeed, national laws remain an imminent force
that reinforce the emergence of markets and legal order-this is not
denied here. Yet the built-in mechanisms of commerce need to be
recognized as playing at least a contributory role in the emergence of
a global commercial legal order. This Article identifies and discusses
these mechanisms, focusing on three: the element of reciprocity, the
practical requirements of the market, and the existence of network
effects. These three elements are key; the market gives rise to similar
legal practices, network effects standardize these practices, and
reciprocity then helps sustain this legal order in the vacuum of
centralized authority.7
In a nutshell, the Article's thesis is this: commercial legal order
is uniquely capable of evolving in a transnational context partially
because it possesses built-in structural features that allow it to

4.
Clear examples of the tendency toward standardization at the macrolevel
abound. Supranational codification efforts such as UNCITRAL, UNIDROIT, CISG, and
the Lando-Principles are but formal reflections of this phenomenon. Indeed, modern
international trade displays a strong tendency toward convergence and harmonization.
5.
I have argued similarly elsewhere. See Bryan H. Druzin, Law Without the
State: The Theory of High Engagement and the Emergence of Spontaneous Legal Order
Within Commercial Systems, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 559, 562, 586 (2010) (positing a theory
of "high engagement" that attempts to account for the ability of commercial law to grow
in a transnational context without resorting to a central legislative authority). Much of
the present discussion builds upon, extends, and conceptually hones some of my earlier
ideas regarding the nature of trade touched on in this paper.
6.
Indeed on the macrolevel, public bodies like the WTO play a major role in
driving this evolution forward. In fact, the WTO, more than any other multisovereign
body, is spearheading the advance of international legal convergence and
standardization.
7.
A case could perhaps be made that these features also exist in
noncommercial interaction. However, besides this being a rather tenuous position
requiring some stretching of the terms reciprocity and market, these characteristics are
far more salient in the case of commerce-there is no question on this point.
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emerge, self-standardize, and sustain itself without a central
authority, and it is this ability that helps explain the incongruous
development of international legal order where in fact there is no
such authority. As such, legal structures within the commercial
sphere are able to advance at a swifter speed than other forms of
legal order that lack these mechanisms. That is, commercial legal
order is able to evolve within what is a state of technical anarchy. 8
The basic structure of trade drives toward convergence-a fact that
may be discerned as much on the macrolevel of state actors as it is on
the microlevel of private parties. For the structuralist account offered
here, the distinction between private and state actors makes little
conceptual difference. It does not matter the size of the trading entity;
all that is required is that it act as a single, unified entity. When
dealing with other states, national governments meet this definition.
The Article's argument is developed in four parts. Part I
discusses the ability of reciprocity to sustain commercial legal order
in the absence of a central coercive authority. Part II then discusses
how market forces channel the emergence of a generally similar body
of law. Part III argues that network effects then help standardize
these legal practices. The discussion on network effects perhaps
represents the Article's strongest contribution to the literature. Part
IV then broadens the scope of the discussion and looks at other
mechanisms of a structural nature that also potentially play a role in
this process. Because of the primary importance of reciprocity, the
market, and network effects in giving rise to stateless commercial
legal order, the bulk of the Article is devoted to examining these three
mechanisms; however, the discussion of other factors is also
important. The Article concludes that, because commercial legal order
is uniquely predisposed to emerge without the state, we should expect
this asymmetrical emergence to not only continue but likely grow
even more extreme. Indeed, a truly unified, largely stateless global
commercial legal order is rapidly coming into focus. This is not the
case for other forms of law. This Article attempts to shed some
theoretical light on why this is occurring. At a time when the
proliferation of international legal structures is accelerating, a closer
look at the unique ability of commercial law to evolve in the absence
of a centralized authority is, to say the least, highly relevant.

8.
Anarchy is understood here as the absence of a central legislative or
coercive authority. See Peter T. Leeson & Edward P. Stringham, Is Government
Inevitable? Comment on Holcombe's Analysis, 9 INDEP. REV. 543, 544-45 (2005)
(evaluating the history of anarchical societies and the existence of anarchy on the
international stage). However, some may take issue with this definition of anarchy. A
conceptual alternative could be "decentralized order" in the Hayekian sense.
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II. MECHANISM ONE: RECIPROCITY

This Part explains how, as the result of reciprocity, commercial
legal order can sustain itself without the enforcement power of a
centralized authority-mechanism one. The Part that follows it then
discusses how commercial legal order can, as the result of market
forces, emerge in a fairly similar fashion-mechanism two. The third
Part then discusses the crucial role of network effects in inducing
standardization-mechanism three. Key to all of this, however, is the
larger, underlying concept that legal order can arise as the child of
the market.9 In more precise terms, that legal order can arise and
sustain itself without a centralized authority. Indeed, this idea forms
the core underpinning of this discussion. As such, it needs to be
outlined, if only briefly.
A. A Vision of Governance as a Child of the Market
The idea that legal order can arise through the mechanics of the
market has been the subject of a great deal of speculation and theory.
Indeed, game theorists, libertarians, anarchists, and law-andeconomics scholars all contend that law may evolve and sustain itself
without the state.10 Economists such as Friedrich Hayek offer a

9.
Phrased more precisely, the market and law develop simultaneously,
working off each other. See B.L. Benson, It Takes Two Invisible Hands to Make a
Market: Lex Mercatoria (Law Merchant) Always Emerges to Facilitate Emerging
Markets, 3 STUD. IN EMERGENT ORD. 100, 100-01 (2010) (discussing the evolution of

the law merchant throughout history and its re-emergence in modern global
commerce).
See ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
10.
DISPUTES 10 (1994) (providing an overview of the development of extralegal norms and
describing the shortcomings of prior theories on the creation of law); 2 FRIEDRICH A.
HAYEK, LAw, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 107-09 (1973)

(defining the commercial legal order as a "catallaxy," the "special kind of spontaneous
order produced by the market through people acting within the rules of the law of
property, tort, and contract"); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System:
Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115,
115-17 (1992) (concluding that "extralegal norms trump legal rules in a given market
only where market participants find that keeping to the industry norms advances their
own self-interest."); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry:
Creating Cooperation Through Norms, Rules, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724,
1724-25 (2001) (examining the cotton industry's creation of a private industry legal
system through the use of default contract rules and merchant tribunals); Karen B.
Clay, Trade Without Law: Private Order Institutions in Mexican California, 13 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 202, 202 (1997) (discussing the facilitation of intermerchant trade by a
private coalition, primarily through the use of a reputation mechanism); Robert Cooter,
StructuralAdjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of DecentralizedLaw, 14
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 215, 215-16 (1994) (focusing on custom as a method of enacting
law and postulating that decentralized governance is key in maintaining an efficient
economy); Robert C. Ellickson, The Aim of Order Without Law, 150 J. INST'L &
THEORETICAL ECON. 97, 97-99 (1994) (theorizing that institutions and groups are
capable of creating cost-minimizing, informal norms that may serve as an alternative
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unique vision of how legal order may emerge." They argue that, just
like markets emerge, the rules of governance may evolve from the
outcome of actors pursuing their individual interestS. 12 Hayek
contends there are two ways in which order can originate: "made"
order and "grown" order.' 3 Similar to Hayek's description, Lon Fuller
distinguishes between "horizontal forms of order" and "vertical order"
imposed by the state. 14 Fuller sees law as something that mirrors the
market order.15 Many theorists speak about "market legal systems"systems of "rules and enforcement procedures which arise from the
processes of the market economy: competition, bargaining, legal
decisions, and so forth; a legal system whose order is 'spontaneous' in
the Hayekian sense." 16 Indeed, the belief that a spontaneous order of
to traditional forms of law); Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade:
Evidence on the Maghribi Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 857, 857 (1989) (focusing on the
use of a reputation mechanism by a private coalition of eleventh century traders to
overcome information asymmetry and limited contract enforcement); Rachel E.
Kranton, Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 830, 830
(1996) (discussing the persistence of reciprocal relationships in trade, even where a
market transaction would be more efficient); Paul R. Milgrom, Douglas C. North &

Barry R. Weingast, The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant,
Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 1 ECON. & POL. 1, 1-4 (1990) (contrasting
the effectiveness of the reputation mechanism versus formal institutions in facilitating
trade in the context of the early middle ages).
11.
See HAYEK, supra note 10, at 115-20 (arguing that, due to individual selfinterest, the ideal societal order is that which individuals would choose if they were
aware their initial position would be decided by chance); see also FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK,
THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 225-43 (George Routledge & Sons 1944) (2002) (criticizing the
proposition that an international centralized economic authority will lead to greater
organization and harmony).

12.

See Bruce L. Benson, Economic Freedom and the Evolution of Law, 18 CATO

J. 209, 209 (1998) ("[M]any rules and institutions for governance evolve as the
unintended outcomes of individuals separately pursuing their own goals (e.g., customs),
just as markets do .... .").
13.
See 1 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER 37 (1973) ("The grown order,
on the other hand, which we have referred to as a self-generating or endogenous order,
is in English most conveniently described as a spontaneous order.").
14.
See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 233 (rev. ed. 1969) (describing
horizontal order as the bond of reciprocity between two coequal individuals and vertical
order as the imposition of rules by the state and the state's reciprocal commitment to
abide by its own rules).

15.

See Barry Macleod-Cullinane, Lon L. Fuller and the Enterprise of Law,

LIBERTARIAN ALLIANCE, 1995, at 1-2 (noting Lon L. Fuller's view that the law mirrors
the market order).
16.
See Roy A. Childs, Jr., The Invisible Hand Strikes Back, 1 J. LIBERTARIAN
STUD. 23, 25 (1977) (contrasting "market legal systems" with "state legal systems").
This idea perhaps finds its fullest expression in the intriguing if not radical theories of
anarcho-capitalism, a unique variant on anarchism. See MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, POWER
AND MARKET: GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY 266 (2d ed. 1977) ("[T]he free-market
economy forms a kind of natural order, so that any interventionary disruption creates
not only disorder but the necessity for repeal or for cumulative disorder in attempting
to combat it."); MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, FOR A NEW LIBERTY: THE LIBERTARIAN
MANIFESTO 199 (rev. ed. 1985) ("If central planning, then, thrusts the economy into
hopeless calculational chaos, and into irrational allocations and production operations,
the advance of government activities inexorably introduces ever greater islands of such
chaos into the economy. . . ."); see also DAVID FRIEDMAN, THE MACHINERY OF FREEDOM
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cooperation can evolve from the market lies at the very heart of
classical liberalism.' 7
The Article references these ideas here because, while many may
have no intellectual sympathy for this vision of law, in its broad
strokes, this is precisely what is happening in the case of law of a
commercial nature in an interregional context: it arises largely
spontaneously as the product of market forces and evolves in the
vacuum of a centralized authority. Whatever one's views regarding
the plausibility of such theories, it is difficult to deny that this
position does appear to hold at least some merit in that this is what is
occurring in the case of so much international commercial legal order.
B. Reciprocity Induces Compliance
The foundational component of invisible-hand approaches that
emphasize market-induced social order is the element of reciprocity.
The claim is that the reciprocal gains from the recognition of the rules
of property and contract (and the potential loss of them) stimulate
voluntary compliance. The underlying dynamic of reciprocity implicit
in trade-that mutual advantage can be achieved-helps sustain
order. Actors will willingly commit themselves to a system of
governance if they grasp that their self-interest is served by such a
commitment. This holds true on the macrolevel as much as on the
microlevel. Whether on the level of private parties, organizations, or
state actors, reciprocity plays a powerful role in inducing compliance.
Thomas Hobbes asserted that contracts "without the sword, are but
Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all."' 8 This is an
overstatement. In his focus on the "stick," Hobbes neglected the
''carrot"; parties under a contract observe their duties mainly because
14 (1973) (describing the theory of anarcho-capitalism and countering the arguments
against its feasibility). The theory calls for the complete elimination of the state, seeing
free-market capitalism unrestrained by the coercive and subverting interference of
government as the basis of a free society. Accordingly, this system necessitates a free
market and complete voluntarism in all transactions. See Susan Love Brown, The Free
Market as Salvation from Government: The Anarcho-CapitalistView, in MEANINGS OF
THE MARKET: THE FREE MARKET IN WESTERN CULTURE 99, 99 (James G. Carrier ed.,

1997) (defining anarcho-capitalism as a system which "minimises coercion and
maximises individual liberty"). In the anarcho-capitalist vision of society, even law
enforcement would be privately supplied through competing protection agencies. David
Friedman, building on the ideas of Rothbard, has argued that a system of law can
evolve reflexively from the functioning of the market, maintaining that legal structures
could emerge as commercial services "produced for profit on the open market."
FRIEDMAN, supra, at 62.
17.
See RAZEEN SALLY, CLASSICAL LIBERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIC
ORDER: STUDIES IN THEORY AND INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 17 (1998) ("[T]he normative

core of classical liberalism is the approbation of economic freedom or laissez
faire ... out of which spontaneously emerges a vast and intricate system of cooperation
in exchanging goods and services and catering for a plentitude of wants.").
18.
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 115 (A. R. Waller ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1904) (1651).
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they are mutually advantageous.19 Indeed, it is because the
agreement offers reciprocal gain that the parties chose to enter into
the contract in the first place. The sword, as Hobbes put it, only
comes into play if the incentive structure changes midstream. 20
1.

The Force of Reciprocity on Both Micro- and Macrolevel

In fact, most business transactions between private parties do
not involve formal contracts at all. 21 The strength of reciprocity is
more than sufficient to sustain agreements. Where they can, however,
parties like to include a bit of stick as well. In the case of private
international parties, the participants will commit themselves to the
force of specific domestic jurisdictions by including choice of forum
clauses in their agreements. In this sense, their agreements
piggyback on the authority of a particular jurisdiction. However,
increasingly, international commercial actors rely upon transnational
arbitration. Enforcement of international arbitration was bolstered by
the 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention),
which provides for court recognition and enforcement of foreign
arbitration decisions.2 2 The New York Convention is an example of
how informal enforcement (reciprocity) can be greatly facilitated by

19.
See ROBERT S. SUMMERS, Lon L. Fuller, in JURISTS: PROFILES IN LEGAL
THEORY 81 (William Twining ed., 1984) ("[Tjhe overwhelming majority of contractual
arrangements go forward without any resort to courts. This is mainly because they are
mutually advantageous, not because of any threats of force."). Indeed, "private
mechanisms generate some degree of contract compliance. . . ." JEFFREY A. MIRON,
LIBERTARIANISM FROM A TO Z 70 (2010). For some early examinations of self-enforcing
agreements, see L. G. Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. BUS. 27, 4344 (1981); B. Klein & K.B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual
Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 616 (1981) (examining the "non-governmental
repeat-purchase" contract enforcement mechanism); see also Bruce L. Benson, The
Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, 55 S. ECON. J. 644, 646 (1989) ("The
authority which can most effectively back law is individual realization of reciprocal
benefits arising from recognition of that law.").
20.
Or to avoid fear of such change, as in the prisoner's dilemma.
21.
See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55, 62 (1963) ("One can conclude that while
detailed planning and legal sanctions play a significant role in some exchanges
between businesses, in many business exchanges their role is small."); see also
AVINASH K. DIXIT, LAWLESSNESS AND ECONOMICS: ALTERNATIVE MODES OF
GOVERNANCE 25 (2007); Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private
Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 1-2 (1981) ("Most business
transactions . . . are conducted using various informal arrangements, such as
handshakes and oral agreements, ongoing relationships, and custom and practice.")
22.
See United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration,
May 20-June 10, 1958, FinalAct and Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. 1, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/8/Rev.1 (Vol. VI) (June 10,
1958) (detailing the application of the convention to the recognition and enforcement of
arbitral awards in foreign states in Article I).
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central enforcement. 23 It should be underscored that the assertion
here is not that reciprocity is a perfect enforcement mechanism but
merely that it is sufficient to sustain legal order where central
enforcement mechanisms are lacking, which is largely the case in the
international context.
On the macrolevel, however, it is a very different story. In the
case of state actors, the source of enforcement is far less clear. With
respect to the interaction of state actors, there is no clear coercive
authority to which to appeal. There is often the option of arbitration
or quasi-judicial settlement bodies through treaties and trade
organizations, but the authority of such bodies is derived solely from
the fact that these states simply acknowledge their authority in the
first place. It is not comparable to the domestic authority of the state
with its recourse to genuine force. In the absence of a central coercive
authority, what ultimately holds enforcement regimes such as these
together is the element of reciprocity. Reciprocities, as illustrated by
treaties where a state agrees to various obligations in exchange for
similar obligations accepted by another state, guide the macrolevel
actions of state actors. Indeed, trade blocs arguably function like
trade associations on the microlevel and are similarly bound together
largely by the force of reciprocity, which compels trade bloc members
to yield to its authority.
The importance of reciprocity is unmistakable in the case of the
WTO. Indeed, the principle of reciprocity is woven into the very fabric
from which the WTO is stitched. 24 Negotiations and agreements
within the WTO framework are informed by the bedrock concept of
reciprocity- (balance). The maintenance of balance is an overarching
concern in provisions for adjustment, such as renegotiation and
safeguard actions.2 5 Reciprocity is an animating principle of
agreements solidified within the WTO framework; it stands as a
foundational norm of negotiation. 26

23.
But see Bruce L. Benson, An Exploration of the Impact of Modern
Arbitration Statutes on the Development of Arbitration in the United States, 11 J.L.
EcoN. & ORG. 479, 497 (1995) (arguing, with substantial supporting evidence, that
similar actions by governments to assert jurisdiction over arbitration enforcement
actually raises the cost of arbitration).
24.
See J. Michael Finger & L. Alan Winters, Reciprocity in the WTO, in
DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, AND THE WTO 50, 50-51 (Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya Mattoo &
Philip English eds., 2002) (noting that the Marrakesh Agreement, which established
the WTO, refers to reciprocity in its preamble).
25.
See id. at 52 (discussing the emphasis on reciprocity in the GATT articles
on renegotiation and safeguard actions).
26.
But see Kyle Bagwell, Robert W. Staiger & Alan 0. Sykes, Border
Instruments, in LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES OF WORLD TRADE LAW 68, 158
(Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2013) ("In practice, while the principle of
reciprocity is a form of negotiation, WTO/GATT rules do not require that negotiations
satisfy the reciprocity principle.").
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Reciprocity is a chief means of ensuring compliance on the
supranational level. State actors are hesitant to not comply with their
agreements because they will pay a price in loss of future commercial
opportunities and reputational costs. In the case of trade, because of
the supportive element of reciprocity, the self-enforcement ability of
long-term commercial agreements is dramatically reinforced. In fact,
the vast majority of commercial agreements, whether on the level of
private parties or that of state actors, are fulfilled without having to
go to dispute because they are mutually advantageous-not because
of any threats of force. 2 7 In the case of private parties, empirical
research has shown that the vast majority of business transactions
are executed without even entering into formal contracts of any
kind.28 Reciprocity in this respect is of paramount importance.
Mutual self-interest helps sustain cooperative relationships. This
profoundly enhances the ability of commercial legal structures to
emerge in a transnational context in the vacuum of a coercive
authority. It should also be said that reciprocity not only sustains
commercial legal structures; it actively encourages its emergence in
that it energizes parties to come together and form commercial
relationships, which call for a legal superstructure of some kind.
2.

The Importance of Both Stick and Carrot

It is important to note that reciprocity may work in two
dimensions. It may unfold negatively as well as positively-there may
be stick in addition to carrot.29 The stick comes in the form of the loss
of a benefit previously enjoyed-for instance, the loss of future gains
to be had through commercial collaboration. In this case, actors will
adhere to rules because noncompliance conflicts with their selfinterest. The impact of a reciprocal stick can indeed be quite
powerful. This is eminently clear in other contexts. Consider the law
of war (jus in bello), where antagonists bent on the other's
destruction, operating in the complete absence of an overarching
authority, nevertheless coalesce around and generally respect a
system of rules to govern their hostilities. Clearly, these are not
parties that are aiming for cooperation. Nevertheless, robust
cooperative structures emerge. This is the result of the reciprocal
dynamic that undergirds the interaction of war. Both sides may view
the situation asymmetrically in that they believe that their side may

27.
See Benson, supra note 19, at 5-6 (discussing the development of
commercial law from the repeated interactions of self-interested merchants).
28.
See Macaulay, supra note 21, at 58 ("Businessmen often prefer to rely on 'a
man's word' in a brief letter, a handshake, or 'common honesty and decency'-even
when the transaction involves exposure to serious risks.").
29.
Note that the colloquial understanding of reciprocity as merely a positive
exchange is extended here, invoking the notion of reciprocity as it is employed in social
psychology, which can be both negative and positive in nature.
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be able to eventually prevail. Yet as they continue to fight, the
assurance of reciprocated harm is enough to persuade the warring
parties to voluntarily abide by a prescribed set of rules. Thus, we see
the somewhat counterintuitive emergence of the rules of war upon
the bloody and chaotic landscape of conflict. It is comparable to
exhausted boxers holding each other for mutual support as they
nonetheless continue to deliver their blows. This is quite a fascinating
dynamic when one stops to really consider it: even while at war, the
force of reciprocity induces high degrees of cooperation and
compliance.3 0 This is negative reciprocity-order sustaining itself
through the negative consequences that would result from
noncompliance, cooperation born of the stick as opposed to the carrot.
In the case of commerce, this is the loss of future commercial
opportunity. This can be contrasted with positive reciprocity,
cooperation arising from a carrot. The dynamic of positive reciprocity
is more obvious and does not require much explanation. Merchants
collaborate because it is mutually beneficial. Trade is a "non-zero-sum
game" where both parties may glean benefit.3 1 Rule compliance is
thus assured in a highly reliable way: not through the threat of
external coercion by a government but by the force of self-interest. In
either case-in both its positive and negative form-reciprocity
induces rule-compliance.
3.

Repetition and Reputation

All of this has been extensively studied by game theorists, where
it is captured by the concept of conditional cooperation. 32 Game

30.
An extraordinary example of conditional cooperation through repetition is
that of soldiers on the Western Front in World War I. Truces were quite common
between Allied and German units that had been facing one another for long periods of
time and fought repeated internecine battles over the same territory. In these
conditions, complex "systems of communication developed to agree terms, apologize for
accidental infractions and ensure relative peace-all without the knowledge of the high
commands on each side . . . . Raids and artillery barrages were used to punish the other
side for defection...." MATT RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF VIRTUE: HUMAN INSTINCTS AND
THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 65 (1996). This was an example of tit-for-tat, a basic
but highly effective conditional cooperation strategy. See id. at 63-65 ("The principal
condition required for Tit-for-tat to work is a stable, repetitive relationship."). In order
to quash the emergence of such truces, commanders would regularly shuffle units
about so no regiment was opposite any other for long enough to build up a relationship
of mutual cooperation. They would, in this way, stymie the cooperative-inducing effects
of repeated interaction and reciprocity. See id. at 65 ("If two Tit-for-tat players meet
each other and get off on the right foot, they cooperate indefinitely.").
31.
See SHANKER SINGHAM, A GENERAL THEORY OF TRADE AND COMPETITION:
TRADE LIBERALISATION AND COMPETITIVE MARKETS 13 (2007) (outlining the driving

factors underlying trade liberalization and competitive markets).
32.

See STEVEN A. HETCHER, NORMS IN A WIRED WORLD 63 (2004) (outlining

the conditional cooperation strategy of tit-for-tat); see also Ernst Fehr & Urs
Fischbacher, Social Norms and Human Cooperation,8 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCl. 185,
186 (2004) (discussing the norm of conditional cooperation).
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theorists contend that conditional cooperation can emerge
spontaneously between players, given the element of reciprocity
together with the possibility of repeated interaction.3 3 The literature
on conditional cooperation is substantial, and it need not be delved
into extensively here. However, the basic thrust of it is this: "I will
help you if you reciprocate; if you harm me, I will retaliate in kind."34
To this end, repetition is crucial, in that it smoothes out any shortterm asymmetrical skewing of incentive structures that may tempt
one party to violate the rules to get some short-term benefit at the
other's expense.35 Or worse, the mere knowledge that this temptation
exists drives actors otherwise willing to cooperate to mutual
betrayal. 36 Repeated interaction helps ensure that reciprocity
maintains order even if this balance may falter in specific short-term
instances.3 7 The "shadow of the future" will generally support a
cooperative equilibrium.3 8 However, it is important to note that, given

33.
The literature in this area is extensive; however, for the foundational and
probably most cited work, see Robert Axelrod & William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of
Cooperation, 211 Scl. 1390, 1396 (1981) (advancing a biological approach to the
development of conditional cooperation); see also Robert Axelrod, The Emergence of
Cooperation Among Egoists, 75 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 306, 317 (1981) ("[Cooperation]
cannot take place if it is tried only by scattered individuals who have no chance to
interact with each other. But cooperation can emerge . . . as long as these individuals
have even a small proportion of their interactions with each other."). Indeed, the idea
that frequent repetition encourages cooperation has become a virtual axiom among
game theorists. See RIDLEY, supra note 30, at 61-62 (recounting the development of the
principle of reciprocity in game theory). I have recently written on the role of
reciprocity and signaling in sustaining legal order in the context of international
treaties. See Bryan H. Druzin, Opening the Machinery of Private Order: Public
InternationalLaw as a Form of Private Ordering, 58 ST. LOUis U. L.J. 423, 465 (2013)
(arguing that treaties that require positive actions, as opposed to merely the absence of
action, induce compliance and treaty longevity, in that this allows for signaling).
34.
His is a basic game strategy known as tit-for-tat. See Axelrod & Hamilton,
supra note 33, at 1391 (detailing the basic theory of the prisoner's dilemma).
35.
Indeed, this is the famous solution to the dilemma in the well-known
Prisoner's Dilemma. See id. ("With two individuals destined never to meet again, the
only strategy that can be called a solution to the game is to defect always despite the
seemingly paradoxical outcome that both do worse than they could have had they
cooperated.").
This is the infamous Prisoner's Dilemma.
36.
37.
See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 163-68 (1985) (making the
case that repeated play and reputation are "private ordering" tools for enforcement).
For a detailed breakdown of the basic structure of repeated games with perfect
monitoring, see GEORGE J. MAILATH & LARRY SAMUELSON, REPEATED GAMES AND
REPUTATIONS: LONG-RUN RELATIONSHIPS 15-24 (2006). Theorists also cite various
other private mechanisms that can be employed to alter the cost-benefit structure for
stronger agents that may be tempted to cheat. See Leeson & Stringham, supra note 8,
at 546-47 ("If private mechanisms are devised that alter the cost-benefit structure of
activities for stronger agents, the imposition of force need not be inevitable.").
38.
See Peter T. Leeson, The Laws of Lawlessness, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 471, 480
(2009) (describing the folk theorem, which suggests that "when play is infinitely
repeated and players are sufficiently patient, the shadow of the future can support the
cooperative equilibrium.").
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sufficient communication, the same mechanisms that engender
compliance and cooperation between two actors can emerge in the
context of very large groups where parties do not repeatedly
interact.3 9 This may be achieved through the threat of reputational
costs.40 In this case, while an actor will suffer no retaliation at the
hands of the party they cheat, other actors in the community will
exact retaliation later down the road. Reputational costs are a
powerful ex post enforcement mechanism that encourages rule
compliance. 41 Indeed, the specter of future boycott and ostracism from
the community is a powerful incentive to follow the rules. 4 2 Thus, a
diamond trader will be hesitant to cheat a client even if the trader
can do so with immediate impunity because doing so will harm the
trader's commercial reputation at a far greater cost in the long run.
In order to "maintain a reputation for dealing under recognized rules
of behavior (i.e., for fair dealings or high moral standards), each
player's dominant strategy is to behave as expected throughout each
game that he plays, whether it is a repeated or a one shot game." 43
Thus, through reputational costs, a large community can achieve a
substantial level of compliance based on what are essentially the
same mechanisms that ensure compliance between just two actorsretaliation.
The upshot of this is that legal order can arise in a decentralized,
spontaneous fashion even within large communities of merchants.
And the community need not be hermetically sealed. It may be a
myriad of partially overlapping communities bound together into a
coherent whole that allows for a sufficient degree of communication-

39.
See Benson, supra note 12, at 218 (discussing the development of
cooperative intergroup relationships).
40.
See Bruce L. Benson, Customary Law as a Social Contract: International
Commercial Law, 3 CONST. POL. EcON. 1, 1, 7 (1992) (arguing that repeated interaction
with another individual does not create the same incentive to abide by set norms as
does interaction with many different individuals and groups, as reputational costs for
noncompliance are higher); Steven T. Schwartz, Richard A. Young & Kristina Zvinakis,
Reputation Without Repeated Interaction: A Role for Public Disclosures, 5 REV. AccT.
STUD. 351, 351 (2000) ("While efficiency gains might be achievable through contracting
or repeated interaction, there are many instances where contracting is costly or illegal
and where transactions are not repeated among the same set of agents.").
41.
Communication within a community can thus be extraordinarily powerful:
"Essentially, investments in communication mechanisms substitute for investments in
capacity for personal violence, and ostracism substitutes for self-help sanctions."
Benson, supra note 12, at 214.
42.
See id. ("Social ostracism ... can be a very significant punishment. In fact,
an individual's incentives to exact physical retribution or tit-for-tat punishment are
weak when competitive alternatives exist and information is easily spread."). Indeed,
"[rieputations can make promises to perform credibly in small economies, and parties
form trade associations partly to shrink the size of the relevant reputational
group. . . ." Alan Schwartz, The Enforcement of Contracts and the Role of the State, in
LEGAL ORDERINGS AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 105, 107 (Fabrizio Cafaggi, Antonio
Nicita & Ugo Pagano eds., 2007).
43.
Benson, supra note 40, at 7.
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a vast network of overlapping, loosely connected communities with
commercial ties that bind huge numbers of actors into what can be
described as a unified community within which a single set of
customs, practices, and rules gain ascendency. In many ways,
communities of merchants are like small communities. It is wellacknowledged that reputational costs and repetition are sufficient in
small groups to bring about stable social ordering. 44 If communities of
merchants are analogous to small communities, the community of
nations represents the tiniest of villages. Indeed, the effects of
reciprocity are even more salient on the national level because the
community of nations is relatively minuscule (there are presently
only 193 states recognized in the United Nations 4 5), and
communication travels so freely that there is a virtual guarantee of
reputational costs. Thus, not only do these mechanisms apply on the
microlevel of private commercial actors and the communities they
form, but they also apply just as powerfully-perhaps even more
powerfully-on the macrolevel of nation-states engaging in trade.
Reciprocity creates both positive (successful trading) and
negative (the loss of trading opportunity) incentives. This is not
necessarily the case with other areas of human interaction. There is
no immediate and clear reciprocity. In the case of trade, because the
rules that evolve provide an element of mutual benefit, the need for a
single external authority to promulgate and enforce a system of rules
is not necessarily required. The force of reciprocity functions as a selfregulating legal mechanism; parties want to achieve consensus.
Indeed, formal coercion is not as essential in a system structured
around self-interest. The basic character of commerce, with its
underlying principle of reciprocity, is itself an authority to which
participants answer. This has given rise to a legal order that
frequently supersedes the constraints of national boundaries. Owing
to this organic evolution, a system of transnational commercial legal
order has steadily evolved in the vacuum of a single coercive power.
This has been facilitated by the element of reciprocity embedded in
the very nature of commerce. The concept of reciprocity plays a
critical role in the "spontaneous law" literature. Reciprocity is central
because it is the primary means of inducing compliance in the
absence of formal enforcement. 46 External coercion is replaced by the
force of self-interest.

See generally ELLICKSON, supra note 10 (detailing the informal norms
.44.
governing the settlement of disputes among cattle farmers in Shasta County,
California).
45.
RUDOLPH C. RSER, INDIGENOUS NATIONS AND MODERN STATES 219 (2012).
46.
See Benson, supra note 12, at 211 (discussing the historical importance of
mutual deterrence in preventing individuals from choosing violence over cooperation to
increase their own wealth); see also Benson, supra note 19 ("[Ilt becomes clear that
reciprocal arrangements are the basic source of the recognition of duty to obey law (and
of law enforcement when state coercion does not exist).").
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C. Reciprocity as a DistinguishingFeatureof Commerce
It is not an exaggeration to say that the element of reciprocity is
an intrinsic feature of trade. Reciprocity is essentially built into
commerce. It is crucial in allowing legal order to advance in the
absence of a single overarching authority. Indeed, as Fuller asserts,
"the concept of reciprocity assumes peculiar importance in a world
where there is no external authority to enforce agreements. That is,
in a world that exists in a Hobbesian state of nature."4 7 Many
libertarian theorists in fact carry this point further, arguing that,
because the authority of customary law is based on a voluntary
recognition that comes from the reciprocal gains of such recognition,
it is in fact "much less likely to be violated than enacted law, imposed
by a state and lacking reciprocity." 48 To be sure, the ability of trade to
conduct itself in the absence of a centralized authority is remarkable
and no doubt can be largely attributed to the fact that it is grounded
upon reciprocal relationships.
The fundamental dilemma facing international law, both public
and private, is that it exists largely in a Hobbesian state of nature
with no authority possessing clear jurisdiction to enforce
agreements. 4 9 Indeed, "while associations ranging from primitive
tribes to modern nation-states are all governed internally by some
form of law, their external relations with one another remain mainly
anarchic."5 0 Stepping beyond the boundaries of nation-states is
essentially stepping into a state of impoverished anarchy. 51 Indeed,
"the world as a whole has operated and continues to operate as
international anarchy . . . . [T]he international sphere remains

anarchic and shows few signs of coming under the rule of formal
government soon."52 Because it is grounded upon reciprocity, the
exchange of property can achieve an astounding degree of selfordering within this vast state of anarchy. A system of commercial
legal order comprises a myriad of countless participants bound
together by the common thread of reciprocity-the essence of trade.
In this sense, the feature of reciprocity forms the underlying
structure of all these numerous relationships; the potential to achieve
some measure of gain through mutual cooperation and reciprocation

47.
Francesco Parisi & Nita Ghei, The Role of Reciprocity in InternationalLaw,
36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 93, 93-94 (2003).
Benson, supra note 19, at 660.
48.
49.
See Parisi & Ghei, supra note 47, at 94 ("International law ... exists in a
state of nature, because there is no overarching legal authority with compulsory
jurisdiction to enforce agreements.").
50.
Jack Hirshleifer, Anarchy and Its Breakdown, 103 J. POL. EcON. 26, 27
(1995).
51.
See Alfred Cuzin, Do We Ever Really Get Out of Anarchy?, 3 J.
LIBERTARIAN STUD. 151, 156 (1979) (explaining the landscape of authority among
institutions outside of the nation-state framework).
52.
Leeson & Stringham, supranote 8, at 544.
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is the basis of commercial interaction. The potential to satisfy mutual
self-interest is the engine that drives commercial trade. If this
element is removed, a system of voluntary commercial relationships
cannot survive.
Indeed, reciprocity serves as the organizing basis of commercial
systems, both past and present: "[A]1though the form of mercantile
transactions has changed over time, the structural underpinnings of
international commerce have remained the same throughout all eras.
Reciprocity in trade, enforced in suppletive law in terms of the
principles of consent, has continued to prevail as the basis of
commerciality."5 3 Reciprocity is, in this way, the distinctive property
of systems of decentralized commercial order. 54 Indeed, "[r]eciprocity,
in the sense of mutual benefits and costs, is the very essence of
trade."55 In contrast to other forms of law where reciprocity does not
emerge with such vigor as its primary characteristic, commercial
legal order can arise without the coercive hand of the state.

D. Why Commercial Communities Are Primed to Produce
Customary Law
The work of Fuller may be of some broader conceptual help here.
In The Morality of Law, Fuller looked closely at the emergence of
customary law, suggesting it is predicated upon a basic sense of
duty.5 6 Fuller then asks: "Under what circumstances does a duty,
legal or moral, become most understandable and most acceptable to
those affected by it?"s7 His answer is an interesting one and highly
relevant for the purposes of this Article: for Fuller, a sense of duty
arises in relation to the element of reciprocity. He concludes that it is
therefore in a society of "economic traders" that the necessary
conditions for the arising of a sense of duty is most potent. 58 In the
absence of third-party enforcement, "reciprocal arrangements are the
basic source of the recognition of duty to obey law (and of law
enforcement when state coercion does not exist)."5 9
Fuller argues that "we may discern three conditions for the
optimum efficacy of the notion of duty. First, the relationship of
reciprocity out of which the duty arises must result from a voluntary

53.
LEON E. TRAKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL
LAW 7 (1983).
54.
See Benson, supra note 19, at 649 (discussing the components of a
decentralized commercial order).
55.
Benson, supra note 19, at 649.
56.
See FULLER, supra note 14, at 19-23 (discussing the advent of customary
law).
Id. at 22-23.
57.
58.
See id. at 23-24 (explaining the relationship between economic trading and
duty).
59.
Benson, supra note 19, at 646.
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agreement between the parties affected; they themselves 'create' the
duty. 60 Second, the reciprocal performances must in some sense be
equal in value." 6 ' That is, no one should be perceived as getting "the
better end of the deal." And third, "the relationships within the
society must be sufficiently fluid so that the same duty you owe me
today, I may owe you tomorrow-in other words, the relationship of
duty must in theory and in practice be reversible . . . ."62 Fuller
argues that these are "the three conditions for optimum realization of
the notion of duty[,] the conditions that make a duty most
understandable and most palatable to the man who owes it."63 Fuller
then goes on to ask, bearing these three principles in mind, in what
kind of community would customary norms most easily emerge? He
concludes that legal ordering of this kind most easily arises within a
community of merchants engaging in commercial interaction. Fuller
explains,
By definition the members of such a society enter direct and
voluntary relationships of exchange. As for equality it is only with the
aid of something like a free market that it is possible to develop
anything like an exact measure for the value of disparate goods . . . .
Finally, economic traders frequently change roles, now selling, now
buying. The duties that arise out of their exchanges are therefore
reversible, not only in theory but in practice. The reversibility of role
that thus characterizes a trading society exists nowhere else in the
same degree, as becomes apparent when we consider the duties
running between parent and child, husband and wife, citizen and
government.64

What exists, then, in a society of traders is a system centered on
voluntary exchange that has at its disposal a common unit of
comparison (money) and that involves relatively fluid relationships
with individuals frequently changing roles (as buyers and sellers). 65
Indeed, because this concoction can cement a sense of duty in the
minds of the participants, they are the perfect ingredients of stateless
legal order. When these conditions are present, decentralized-yet60.

See FULLER, supra note 14, at 23. A contractual relationship, we can

assume, meets this criterion. An argument can be made that individuals sometimes are
"forced" into business relationships out of economic necessity, a form of financial
duress. In this sense, the truly voluntary nature of the relationship could be

questioned. However, for Fuller's purposes, this would still qualify as a relationship of
reciprocity resulting from a voluntary agreement as all that is required under Fuller's
definition is a clear recognition of the benefit gleaned from the interaction. Thus, the
choice can still be said to be voluntary insofar as that particular agreement goes. See
generally FULLER, supra note 14.
61.
FULLER, supra note 14, at 23.

62.

Id. at 23-24.

63.

Id.

Id. at 24.
64.
65.
See Macleod-Cullinane, supra note 15, at 6 ("Based upon voluntary trade, a
common unit of comparison (money), and the changing roles of individuals (as buyers
and sellers), the market order is that form of social organisation that best accords to
the morality of duty.").
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stable legal order can emerge where parties are willing to comply
with the rules formulated to govern their relations. It is notable that
the feature Fuller cites as so important is the relationship of
reciprocity. His observations are relevant here because commercial
relationships perfectly exhibit these three conditions. This is true as
much on the microlevel of private parties as on the macrolevel of
state actors. Fuller's analysis helps shed some light on why
customary norms may emerge so easily within commercial
communities, be they the norms of the international diamond trade or
the norms of multisovereign bodies, such as the WTO or ASEAN.
Fuller's conclusions apply as much to a community of trading nations
as to a community of trading merchants-it is as true on the
macrolevel of state actors as on the microlevel of private parties.
Before moving on to Part II, Part I concludes with a summary of
the preceding discussion. Mutual benefit ensures a degree of
willingness to come together and formulate a system of regulation to
oversee this process. This aspect of mutual, immediate, and
quantifiable benefit, while implicit in commerce, is less pronounced in
other areas of law. Arguably, the most powerful force that can
invigorate a system of law is an unshakable realization by all
participants that subscribing to it is in their individual interests. It is
this basic recognition that forms the very substratum of commercial
legal order. Indeed, commercial legal order is unique in the degree to
which the element of reciprocity underpins it. The reciprocal gains
from the recognition of rules of property and contract-and the
potential loss of them-thus serve as a self-enforcing mechanism,
encouraging compliance. The need for an external authority to
enforce this system of rules is thus not necessarily required. This
creates a legal phenomenon that is far more amenable to a
transregional evolution where a central coercive authority is not
present. The element of reciprocity helps explain how, even in the
absence of a central authority, legal order can be sustained-that is,
how it can achieve high degrees of self-enforcement. However, this
still leaves the question, without a central authority to create the
rules, how can rules arise? Having discussed the crucial role of
reciprocity in sustaining commercial order without the state, Part II
will address the question of how complex legal practices and
standards can arise without the state.
III. MECHANISM TWO: MARKET PRESSURES

Perhaps an even more fundamental question than the issue of
compliance is, how can these rules arise in the absence of a central
legislating power in the first place, and moreover, possess a generally
similar character? The answer is that legal practices need not be
conceived of and imposed top down; they can grow bottom up in a
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decentralized manner, guided by market forces. The fact that the
rules are guided by market forces accounts for their general
similarity. This Part deals with how market pressures give rise to
generally similar legal structures, employing the medieval Law
Merchant (an oft-cited example) to illustrate the process.
A. CommercialLaw as an Instrument of the Market
As much as a common medium of exchange is important to trade,
so too is a coherent body of rules under which it can operate. Market
pressures thus give rise to many common legal practices because
these practices "grease the wheels" of trade. 66 Because they evolve
from the practical necessities of trade, these legal practices tend to be
fairly consistent across regions. 67 Because the basic requirements of
trade are the same, the rules that arise to oversee trade often tend to
be similar. Moreover, market pressures tend to create a degree of
general uniformity in these practices because uniformity itself
provides a benefit. As a result, in many aspects, commercial legal
order demonstrates a general degree of similarity-all without the
need for a centralized planner. The contracts of private actors reflect
a general similarity in their use of business custom and the
procedures of international arbitration, 68 and international trade
agreements reflect a generally similar legal order among state actors.
General standards emerge. In either case-the micro- or macrolevelthese commercial legal structures arise in response to the practical
requirements of the market. The legal structures are, in a sense,
instruments of the market. The result is that a complex body of
commercial rules may arise without the need to be formulated by a
central authority; the market formulates legal order spontaneously in
a decentralized fashion out of sheer practical necessity. The outcome
is a fairly consistent system of legal order followed by vast
communities of merchants, institutions, and governments alike.

66.
See generally TRAKMAN, supra note 53.
67.
See TRAKMAN, supra note 53, at 14 (comparing the legal practices of the
Law Merchant from a regional perspective).
68.
The pressing need for uniformity in the case of international arbitration is
reflected in legislative efforts throughout the twentieth century, such as the Rules on
Commercial Arbitration formulated by the International Law Association in 1950, a
Uniform Law on Arbitration in Respect of Relations of Private Law developed by
UNIDROIT in 1935 and amended by the Legal Committee of the Consultative
Assembly of the Council of Europe in 1957, the European Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration concluded in 1961, the ECE Rules for International
Commercial Arbitration created by the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe in 1966, and UNCITRAL's rules for ad hoc arbitration. See generally Fernando
Mantilla-Serrano, Towards a TransnationalProcedural Public Policy, in TOWARDS A
UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW? 163-198 (Emmanuel Gaillard et al. eds.,

2005) (exploring the emergence of a truly uniform international arbitration law).
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Consider the basic principles of contract. The principles of
formation, consent, misrepresentation, mistake, and duress all arose
incrementally from the customary rules of merchants, not through
the complex mechanics of formal legislation.6 9 These principles arose
because they facilitated the practice of trade. 70 B.L. Benson, building
on the ideas of both Fuller and Hayek, has written persuasively on
the notion that commercial legal order tends to evolve naturally in
line with the needs of commerce.71 In Benson's view, if left to its own
devices, commercial legal structures will evolve primarily because
they facilitate commercial activity, making it more efficient.7 2 He
contends that rules and governmental institutions may evolve as the
unintended outcomes of individuals separately pursuing their own
goals in the same way commercial structures develop.73 This unfolds
in an evolutionary-like process: complex legal structures develop
through a process of trial and error because "the actions they are
intended to coordinate are performed more effectively under one
institutional arrangement or process than under another. The more
effective institutions and practices replace the less effective." 74
Consequently, basic commercial legal structures tend to be similar.
They are similar because they reinforce business; the requirements of
the market, which are more or less universal, channel the evolution of
legal structures in similar directions.
The state is thus not indispensable in the project of commercially
oriented law. This is borne out by the historical Law Merchant as
well as its modern equivalent. Indeed, the medieval Law Merchant is
a perfect example of the capability of commerce to produce a
relatively uniform body of legal order in the absence of a centralized
authority. As such, the remainder of Part II will explore the Law
Merchant example in detail.
B. An Example Drawn from History: The Medieval Law Merchant
For anyone wanting a concrete example of the ideas discussed
above, they need not look any further than the system of commercial
legal order that arose in Western Europe during the medieval age.
Indeed, the medieval Law Merchant powerfully illustrates the self-

69.
See Cooter, supra note 10, at 2 ("[J]udges dictated conformity to merchant
practices, not the practices to which merchants should conform. By this process, the
Law Merchant was allegedly absorbed into English common law.").
70.
See Benson, supra note 19, at 644, 647 (discussing the basic principles of
contract law).
71.
See, e.g., Benson, supra note 19, at 650 (discussing the evolution of the
commercial legal order).
72.
See generally Benson, supra note 12 (describing how commercial legal order
can be established).
73.
See id. (discussing the natural evolution of commercial institutions over
time).
74.
Benson, supra note 19, at 644.
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generative capacity of commercial customary norms.7 5 The reader
should note that while Part II focuses on the medieval Law Merchant,
it is but one historical example of private legal ordering: American
fish wholesalers, eleventh-century Maghribi traders, and many other
merchant communities are all equally good examples of systems of
decentralized commercial legal order. 76 The elaborate system of law
that evolved in medieval Iceland in the complete absence of a coercive
state, relying wholly on market mechanisms and private institutions,
is another good example."7 However, for clarity, this Article will limit
its focus to the medieval Law Merchant. In the tenth, eleventh, and
twelfth centuries, merchants created an international system of law
to regulate the expanding networks of European trade and beyond.7 8
During this period, "the basic concepts and institutions of modern
Western mercantile law-lex mercatoria (the Law Merchant)-were
formed, and, even more importantly, it was then that mercantile law
in the west first came to be viewed as an integrated, developing
system, a body of law." 79 The Law Merchant was, as Fuller would say,
a form of "horizontal law"s 0-law formulated bottom-up by merchants
in a spontaneous fashion rather than imposed from on high through
the legislative will of a state. It reflected the needs of day-to-day
commerce; it was, in many respects, a creation of the market.
In the absence of a centralized authority, merchant courts
emerged along trade routes and trading centers to resolve the legal
disputes that would invariably arise between merchants. Parties to a

75.
See PETER T. LEESON, THE INVISIBLE HOOK: THE HIDDEN ECONOMICS OF
PIRATES (2009); JOHN UMBECK, A THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS WITH APPLICATIONS TO
THE CALIFORNIAN GOLD RUSH (1989); Terry L. Anderson & Peter Hill, American

Experiment in Anarcho-Capitalism:The Not so Wild, Wild West, 3 J. Liberation Stud. 9
(1979); David Friedman, Private Creation and Enforcement of Law: A HistoricalCase, 8
J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1979); Greif, supra note 10, at 857; Leeson, supra note 38, at 482;

Peter T. Leeson, An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization, 115 J.
POL. ECON. 1049 (2007) for other historical analysis of systems of customary law. These
systems include the Maghribi Traders, medieval Iceland, mining camps in the
American West, the Leges Marchiarum (the Law of the Marshes), an intricate system
of criminal law related to cross-border banditry ("reviving") that emerged in the AngloScottish borderlands from the thirteenth to sixteenth century, and the ordering system
between pirates.
76.
For some discussion of these, see John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff,

Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2421, 2433-36
(2000).
77.
See Friedman, supra note 75, at 399-400 (explaining how a complex legal
system developed in Iceland, albeit with peculiar characteristics); see also Carrie B.
Kerekes & Claudia R. Williamson, Discovering Law: Hayekian Competition in Medieval
Iceland, 21 GRIFFITH L. REV. 432, 432 (2012) (discussing the system of law in medieval
Iceland).
78.
TRAKMAN, supra note 53, at 8-12.
79.
HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, THE FORMATION OF THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 333 (1983).
See FULLER, supra note 14, at 233 (discussing the legal framework of the
80.
Law Merchant).
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legal claim would accept the court's decisions largely out of fear of
commercial ostracism, a common penalty for those who refused to
accept the ruling of the court.8 1 "The threat of boycott of all future
trade 'proved, if anything more effective than physical coercion.' 8 2
The element of reciprocity and "the threat of business sanctions
compelled performance." 83 This illustrates the point made above
regarding the ability of reciprocity, both negative and positive, to
induce compliance even in the absence of a centralized coercive
authority. While the literature on the Law Merchant is not without
its detractors,8 4 lex mercatoria arguably shows that the "reciprocal
gains from the recognition of rules of property and contract provided
sufficient incentives for merchants to establish their own stateless
enterprise of law."8 5
The medieval Law Merchant was absorbed by the common law
during the rise of the modern state. Yet the Law Merchant has reemerged as a primary force in current international commercial
trade, where it continues to evolve in the absence of a centralized
authority.86 Arguably, the evolutionary process of the medieval Law
Merchant could not have been achieved through intentional design.8 7
It needed to emerge in a decentralized manner. Indeed, that the Law
Merchant arose within the social chaos of the medieval period flies in
the face of the conventional wisdom that legal order needs the
guiding hand of the state. However, it should not be surprising that a
viable system of customary legal order was able to emerge. "Custom,
not law, has been the fulcrum of commerce since the origins of
exchange."8 8 What gave force to this system of customary law were
the needs of the market. The Law Merchant was shaped by market
forces, which guided its development.

81.
See Benson, supra note 19, at 650 (explaining the reasons why parties in
dispute accepted merchant court decisions).
82.
Id. at 649.
83.
TRAKMAN, supranote 53, at 10.
84.
Indeed, critics of this literature contend that this account of the law
merchant has primarily been produced by antigovernment ideologues who have
distorted the facts (and perhaps fabricated them) in an effort to show that the state is
not necessary for legal order. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, Busting Arbitration
Myths, 56 KAN. L. REV. 663 (2008); Emily Kadens, The Myth of the Customary Law
Merchant, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1153 (2012); Stephen E. Sachs, From St. Ives to Cyberspace:
The Modern Distortions of the Medieval Law Merchant, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 685
(2006); Oliver Volckart & Antje Mangels, Are the Roots of the Modern Lex Mercatoria
Really Medieval?, 65 S. ECON. J. 427 (1999).
Benson, supra note 19, at 646.
85.
86.
See generally Benson, supra note 19, at 660 ("Customary law continues to
'govern' most commercial interaction today.").
87.
See id. ("The market process could not develop and evolve without a
coterminously evolving, clearly defined and enforceable set of rules of property and
contract of course.").
88.
TRAKMAN, supra note 53, at 7.
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C. The Law Merchant Reinforced Business
The Law Merchant was a tool of unified commercial discourse
that transcended the hotchpotch of different local systems of law that
traders would encounter, such as ecclesiastical, manorial, and civil.89
The Law Merchant provided a measure of standardization. This
universality was a requirement of the evolving system of exchange.
The Law Merchant created a largely transregional law of trade, itself
representing an essential advancement in commerce. "[The]
uniformity and universality of the resulting customary rules
facilitated transnational trade in a world of parochial local
jurisdictions hostile to foreign merchants and lacking unifying
states."9 0 The emergence of a standardized system of law thus proved
invaluable to the enterprise of trade: "As international trade
developed, the benefits from a uniform rules and uniform application
of those rules superseded the benefits of discriminatory rules and
rulings that might favor a few local individuals."9 1
Consistency in the rules overseeing trade was absolutely vital in
allowing a system of transregional exchange to develop. The Law
Merchant represented what Fuller calls a "language of
interaction" 9 2-an instrument of communication among a community
of merchants from disparate cultural and political settings with a
limited degree of mutual trust. The growing commercial needs of
merchants traveling between these various regions demanded a
uniform and commonly recognized system of law to facilitate the
common objectives of commerce. Merchants from all across medieval
Europe would travel vast distances to exchange goods in fairs and
village markets with parties they knew little about and with whom
they shared no common cultural bond.93 In this setting, localized and
contradictory legal customs were a significant impediment to the free
flow of commerce. Thus, a clear system of rules to oversee trade was a
necessity. As these traders engaged in commercial interaction,
business customs became increasingly better-defined and less
arbitrary. A coherent legal order emerged, much like a common
trading language. The Law Merchant grew out of repeated dealings
between traders because it facilitated the ability of these merchants
to engage in the act of trade. The law that arose was, in a very real
sense, in response to the requirements of the market-an instrument

89.
90.
uniformly
Europe.
91.
92.
ed., 1981).
93.

Macleod-Cullinane, supra note 15, at 5.
Kadens, supra note 84, at 1155. But see this same paper arguing that the
and universally adopted Law Merchant facilitated international trade in
Benson, supra note 19, at 648.
LON L. FULLER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER 213 (Kenneth I. Winston
See Benson, supra note 19, at 649.
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of the market. Legal practices arose to assist the endeavor of
commerce.
The emergence of credit is a good example. Benson points out
that, by the twelfth century, "the main forms of credit extended by
sellers to buyers were promissory notes and bills of exchange." 94 Prior
to this period, the practice of negotiability of credit instruments did
not exist.9 5 Negotiability of credit was a critical innovation that
allowed trade to flourish. It "was 'invented' by Western merchants
because of the need for improved means of exchange as commerce
developed." 96 This was largely because "the rise of the Law Merchant
generated sufficient confidence in the commercial system so that a
reservoir of commercial credit could be established."9 7 Legal practices
evolved during this period as a response to the needs of the market.
Every "procedural or substantive legal rule in the Law Merchant thus
had a practical genesis."98 Another good example of this was the
recognition of a document lacking notarial execution as valid so long
as it was signed by the relevant parties, as this greatly aided in the
speed of transactions and reduced costs.9 9 Likewise, rules regarding
the passing of property without actual physical delivery evolved in
order to address problems associated with the geographical
impediments traders typically encountered.10 0 The overall body of law
that emerged was a response to the practical requirements of the
market.
Over time, merchant business practices were increasingly put
into writing in the form of written commercial instruments and
contracts.1 01 Thus, the Law Merchant arose from the pages of
contracts voluntarily agreed to by private merchants. These contracts
were not law in the sense of codified commercial legislation drafted by
the disinterested minds of government but rather predicated upon
the specific agreements drawn up by traders themselves. Invariably,
the Law Merchant would gradually incorporate these contractual
usages. In every aspect of the Law Merchant, the contract itself was
the focal point of all legal issues; the agreement between traders was
of absolute dominance in these matters. All other questions were

94.
Id. at 650-51.
95.
See id. (discussing the emergence of credit instruments as mechanisms for
trade).
96.
Id. at 651.
97.
Id.
98.
TRAKMAN, supra note 53, at 14.
99.
See id. at 14-15 (explaining tactics used in the Law Merchant to increase
efficiency).
100.
See id. at 15 ("The rule permitting a passing of ownership without physical
delivery overcame the difficulties associated with the geographic distances between
transactors.").
101.
Benson, supra note 19, at 649 ("Furthermore, as the norms of commercial
law became more precisely specified they were increasingly recorded in writing.").
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"subservient to its dominating function as a regulator of behavior."102
The agreement formed the cornerstone of the Law Merchant precisely
because this law arose to serve the requirements of trade; before all
else, this was its overriding objective. The Law Merchant sprang from
the business customs prevalent at the time, which evolved because
they assisted the undertaking of trade. A fundamental respect for the
merchant practice as a primary source of regulation reverberated
throughout the evolution of the lex mercatoria.0 3 The law "reinforced
rather than superseded the cycle of business practice. It commanded
merchants to do that which they themselves had promised to do.
Moreover, it generally avoided complex legal forms and mandatory
controls over business that had not already been sanctioned either in
custom or in commercial habit."104 As the Law Merchant emerged in
response to the needs of merchants, above all it was functional rather
than ideological. 0 5 It was formulated to govern the dealings of
traders, and was itself an administrative reflection of the
requirements of these dealings.
It is, however, debatable as to whether the medieval Law
Merchant truly could be considered a unified single market. Local
governments did at times attempt to exert influence over the law
governing trade in their region to gain some relative commercial
advantage for local traders.106 The Merchants of Antwerp, for
instance, "refused to submit to the law of London, on the ground that
the law of London discriminated against them." 0 7 Local merchant
courts were not always impartial, often favoring local merchants over
foreign traders. 0 8 However, it is astonishing that, in absence of a
central authority, a relatively uniform system of commercial legal
order nevertheless emerged in medieval Europe, despite these
attempts at rent-seeking by local authorities. It speaks to the degree
to which market forces that required (and still require) a uniform
body of law helped create the commercial law of the period. Despite
this tendency toward local favoritism, the Law Merchant developed
by the hands of merchants with disparate profit incentives, mutual
distrust, and little in common. This fact is a stark testament to the

102.
TRAKMAN, supra note 53, at 10.
103.
See Marlene Wethmar-Lemmer, The Development of the Modern Lex
Mercatoria: A Historical Perspective, 11 FUNDAMINA: A JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY
183, 189 (2005) ("[The lex mercatoria embodied a respect for merchant practice as a
primary source of regulation and the 'law' as a secondary control over commerce.").
104.
TRAKMAN, supra note 53, at 18.
105.
See Leon E. Trakman, From the Medieval Law Merchant to E-Merchant
Law, 53 U. TORONTO L.J. 265, 274 (2003) ("[T]hese developments were functional more
than ideological.").
106.
See Trakman, supra note 53, at 19-20 (providing several jurisdictions that
enacted ordinances to favor local merchants).
107.
Id. at 20.
108.
See id. at 19 ("In addition, local merchant courts were not always impartial
in their treatment of foreigners.").
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power that market forces exert over the formation of commercial legal
order. 0 9 Indeed, on a fundamental level, market forces created the
Law Merchant-and they continue to do so today.
D. The Modern Law Merchant
As already mentioned, the Law Merchant arguably did not
disappear. The Law Merchant simply transformed as it was co-opted
and codified by state law. 110 It was subsumed by the emergence of
national commercial law codes. The Law Merchant remained the
primary source of commercial law in both the common law and civil
law systems,111 and has now re-emerged in the present age. A
coherent legal order is a practical requirement of international trade,
which cannot wait around for state law to play catch-up. The
demands of a global market, much as with the medieval Law
Merchant, have given rise to relatively standardized legal structures
within the vacuum of a central authority. Thus, there is the ascension
of a new Law Merchant. The modern Law Merchant, while
fragmented by the fissures of national law, still exists. 112 Indeed,
"[i]nternational commercial law is still largely independent of
nationalized legal systems, retaining many of the basic (though)
modernized institutional characteristics of the medieval Law
Merchant."1 3 Like the Law Merchant of old, the modern Law
Merchant is above all a response to the needs of the community of
merchants from which it has evolved. Its guiding spirit is efficiency
and pragmatism because this is what the market requires the world
over. The growing use of dispute resolution speaks to the ability and
need of merchants (as well as state actors) to adjudicate their own
legal matters. The practices and procedures of international
commercial arbitration are remarkably similar, not unlike its
medieval predecessor. 114 Like the medieval Law Merchant, modern
commercial arbitration is "surrounded by a lus commune, a law
common to merchants . . . . This ius commune is evident in the

codification of mercantile arbitration rules both within bi- and

109.
In fact, even after the absorption of Law Merchant into State law, elements
of the Law Merchant still levied a considerable influence upon the courts.
110.
See TRAKMAN, supranote 53, at 23 ("[The Law Merchant] was transformed
in character during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to blend with local
influences.").
111.
See id. ("[T]he foundations of the Law Merchant ... remained intact in both
civil and common law systems.").
112.
See Trakman, supra note 103, at 283 (citing the emergence of nation-states
as fracturing, but not eliminating, the Law Merchant).
113.
Benson, supra note 40, at 1.
114.
See Trakman, supra note 103, at 282 (explaining that the conventions of
international commercial arbitration may be inherently similar to the Law Merchant
court because of reliance on trade usage).
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multilateral conventions, as well as in the rules of international
commercial arbitration associations.""1
In large measure, international commercial law-the body of law
that has arisen within a transregional context on the back of
increasing commercial trade between private as well as state actorsis simply a product of ubiquitous market forces that usher it into
being, channeling its evolution, just as with the Law Merchant of old.
As such, it should not be surprising that such legal order exhibits a
high degree of standardization. Because these legal structures
emerge in line with the needs of the market, and because these needs
tend to be the same everywhere, a degree of general uniformity
results.

IV. MECHANISM THREE: NETWORK EFFECTS

A. The Limits of Market-Induced Uniformity
Yet this uniformity is not perfect. It is important to not overstate
the case, as much of the literature has in fact done.116 This uniformity
is merely a general similarity of common practices requisite to trade.
Many practices and usages often vary considerably across commercial
communities. A recent expanding literature in fact questions the true
sweep of market-induced uniformity in the Law Merchant, arguing
that customary
commercial
law
often
shows
signs
of
"polycentrism."" 7 More recently, Benson has defined the Law
Merchant as "a distinct, but not independent, system of polycentric
customary law evolving spontaneously from the bottom up through
the interactions of merchants.""18 Yet from this web of polycentric
systems of legal practices, commonly held rules do emerge.119 Some of
this may be explained by rule-emulation. Indeed, Benson makes this
argument: "Many intra-group rules will be commonly held .

.

. and

emulation also will occur where differences initially exist but
individuals perceive superior arrangements among other groups, so
many common customs can exist in an extensive polycentric web of
communities."1 20 Part III discusses the concept of emulation below in

115.
Id.
116.
Trakman, Benson, and other writers have certainly fallen victim to this,
although subsequent publications by Benson step back from the argument. See
generally, e.g., B.L. Benson, The Law Merchant Story: How Romantic is it?, in LAw,
EcONOMICS, AND EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 68 (Peer Zumbansen & Gralf-Peter Calliess
eds., 2011).
117.
See id.
118.
Id. at 72.
119.
See id. ("Also note that many of these legal systems were polycentric.
Different royal law, manorial law, and local custom applied in different areas although
they often had similar rules.").
120.
Id. at 71.

2014/

ANARCHY ORDER, AND TRADE

1077

more detail.121 However, it is argued here that the primary
mechanism that induces this commonality is network effects. The
propensity of trade to extend its reach across regions tends to
extinguish polycentrism because this generates network effects. Much
like regional dialects, with higher levels of interaction comes the need
for standardization and a common tongue. 122 Thus, even in situations
of polycentrism, high degrees of uniformity arise as network effects
push the market for legal rules toward ever-higher levels of
standardization. The higher the intensity of interconnectivity, the
more standardization will occur as a result.
Where market-induced uniformity falters, network effects pick
up the slack. This causes customary law to self-standardize; network
effects help consummate the job initiated by market pressures.
Demands of the market are similar across regions, and therefore the
basic legal structures they engender tend to be similar. However,
where differences remain, increased interregional interaction
generates network effects that induce uniformity. Remaining regional
differences thus tend to get ironed out under the increasing pressure
of network effects. Given the structural composition of trade, network
effects are not only possible, but a strong case could be made that
they are inevitable (provided there is a sufficient interaction between
merchants or state actors). This drives toward an obvious conclusion:
as interaction increases, standardization will increase. Following this
logic, while polycentrism will stubbornly remain in places, the
accelerating volume of global trade should lead to increasing levels of
overall standardization.
B. What are Network Effects?
So what exactly are network effects? A network effect is
essentially the idea that the implicit value of a product increases as
the number of other agents using the same product grows, which in
turn draws more users.123 It is commonly seen in relation to goods
that require a standard platform to operate, such as telephones and
fax machines. 124 Network externalities arise from the need for

121.
See infra Part III.C.
122.
See discussion of the interregional character of trade in greater detail infra
Part IV.A.
See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externalities, in 2 THE
123.
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 671, 671 (Peter Newman ed.,
1998) (illustrating the benefit derived from a product when the number of people using
the same product increases).
For a very good overview of other network effect examples in a wide range
124.
of contexts, see Joseph Farrell & Paul Klemperer, Coordination and Lock-In:
Competition With Switching Costs and Network Effects, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 1967, 2012-20 (M. Armstrong & R. Porter eds., 2007).
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compatibility between products.125 This is because an item's inherent
utility hinges upon its ability to facilitate interaction between agents:
"[T]he utility that a given user derives from the good depends upon
the number of other users who are in the same 'network' . . . ."126 As
more users begin to use the product and its utility grows, even more
consumers will choose to use the product, and on it goes, creating a
kind of snowball effect as more and more users flock to the product or
standard. This kind of positive feedback lies at the heart of a network
effect; the dynamic can reinforce bourgeoning patterns, causing these
patterns to become progressively more entrenched over time. When a
market has settled upon a single standard and all competing
standards have left, the market "is said to have tipped."127
Networked markets exhibiting multiple standards are
considered extremely "tippy."128 Indeed, "[w]hen two or more firms
compete for a market where there is strong positive feedback, only
one may emerge as the winner."129 A clear single standard will
eventually come to dominate. As this Article argues elsewhere, the
market for legal standards and practices can tip precisely in this
fashion, inducing high levels of standardization.13 0 Migrating from
the domain of economic theory, the concept of network effects has
been presented as a way to explain the ascendancy of particular
products over others in the market.1 3 1 It is a useful concept drawn
from the field of economics that accounts for how certain commercial
products proliferate in a path-dependent manner. Oft-cited examples
include VHS's dominance over Beta and the standardization of the

125.
Note that I am referring here to what are known as direct (as opposed to
indirect) network externalities.
126.
Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985).
127.
William H. Page & John E. Lopatka, Network Externalities, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 952, 960 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De
Geest eds., 2000). See also Thomas C. Schelling, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR
92-94, 98-99 (rev. ed. 2006) (influencing the decision to "tip-in" or "tip-out" is the
amount of people already participating in the activity).
128.
See TIM WEITZEL, ECONOMICS OF STANDARDS IN INFORMATION NETWORKS
24 (2004) (regarding a market with multiple standards as one that will likely lean
toward one standard while eliminating the others); Rudi Bekkers, MOBILE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS STANDARDS: GSM, UMTS, TETRA, AND ERMES 196 (2001)
("Some economists call such a market 'tippy' or 'tipping,' and they believe that it is
unlikely that all firms or designs will survive [7, 16, 17].").
129.
CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE
To NETWORK ECONOMY 176 (1998).
130.
See Bryan H. Druzin, Buying Commercial Law: Choice of law, Choice of
Forum, and Network Effect, 18 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 131, 149-56 (2009) (arguing
that network effects induce standardization in choice of law and choice of forum clauses
in transnational commercial contracts).
131.
For the early foundational work in this field, see Jeffrey Rohlfs, A Theory of
Interdependent Demand for a Communications Service, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCI. 16 (1974). See discussion supra Part III.C (likening the ascendency of certain
consumer products due to network effect to the ascendency of certain jurisdictions).
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QWERTY keyboard layout.132 Yet network effects may apply with
equal vigor to any networked system where participants are free to
select the standard they wish to use and will benefit from increased
standardization.13 3 The interconnectivity of trade creates highly
networked systems.
C. Network Effects and the Standardizationof Legal Practices
A great deal of uniformity is already ensured by the fact that the
requirements of trade tend to be generally the same across regions,
and that uniformity itself is such a requirement. However, network
effects reinforce this uniformity. They provide an explanation of how
legal practices are able to self-standardize in the absence of a
centralized legislative authority. As more traders-including state
actors-embrace a specific legal practice or standard, this draws
others to do likewise. There is an implicit benefit in adopting the
dominant practice in that it facilitates a merchant's ability to do
business with a greater number of traders. Familiarity with specific,
widely recognized business practices can deliver returns in terms of
efficiency through the ability to work with these practices, including
anticipating their use and cost-savings in the course of conducting
trade. Indeed, if merchants needed to learn how to employ a new
commercial-legal practice each and every time they engaged in
commercial dealings, it would be enormously challenging-similar to
learning a new language with each and every person one
encounters. 134 All things being equal, it is more efficient to simply
adopt the prevailing legal practice. Indeed, this process is clear in the
case of actual languages. Trading languages emerge along
commercial routes to facilitate communication between merchants.
The emergence of "vehicular languages" such as pidgin is often seen
along trade routes. Swahili is an example of a trade language. Trade
languages are a linguistic expression of the need for standardization
between traders, but they are just one manifestation.
This Article argues elsewhere that the impact of network effects
may be discerned with respect to the standardization of choice of law
and choice of forum clauses in transnational contracts. 3 5 This is a
For an argument disputing the veracity of the VHS and QWERTY example,
132.
see S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice Be a Concern of
Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 283, 312-16 (1996).
For information on how the concept of network effect has been applied in
133.
the literature of path dependence, see generally W. Brian Arthur, Competing
Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events, 99 ECON J. 116
(1989); W. Brian Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, 262 Scl. AM. 92 (1990); S.
J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In and History, 11 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995).
See, e.g., Farrell & Klemperer, supra note 124, at 1972 (describing how this
134.
process is called "switching costs" in the network effect literature).
See supra Part III.B.
135.
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good illustration of the point in question on the microlevel of private
parties-the number of "consumers" who select a specific choice of
law or choice of forum provision is analogous to the number of
consumers who use a certain product. 136 As the number of consumers
increases, so too does the inherent value of using that jurisdiction,
which induces even more people to "purchase" that jurisdiction's
law. 137 This Article argues that the nature of commerce renders
transnational commercial law ideally calibrated to produce network
effects. The twin ingredients of fluid interaction and frequent choice
present in commercial dealings invariably trigger network effects.
Interaction demands synchronization, and frequent opportunities to
select law in each new commercial relationship induce a general drift
toward a standard jurisdiction. This same logic applies to legal
practices writ large. Choice of forum and choice of law clauses are but
two examples of this phenomenon. Network effects are arguably
responsible-at least in part-for the general spread of legal norms,
the emergence of standard terms of contract, the rules of arbitration,
and even recognized geographical centers of arbitration for certain
industries.1 3 8 This is also true for the macrolevel of state actors
adopting the provisions that structure treaty arrangements. Given
sufficient interaction, network effects will cause a general drift
toward a single standard. Provided that there is no strong incentive
to keep the existing standard, there is every reason to adopt the
prevailing standard as one plugs into a new network of legal norms.
The benefit implicit in converging upon a specific standard is
thus sufficient to generate powerful network effects in the market for
legal standards, inducing unprompted standardization. Network
effects will not, however, manifest in noncommercial areas of law.
The reason is structural: unlike private parties engaging in contracts
or state actors entering treaty relationships, participants do not
actively choose the legal standards they wish to employ to regulate
their relationships. This is a feature unique to commercial
relationships. Commercial association is therefore structurally
primed to produce network effects; this is not the case for
noncommercial relationships.
D. Polycentrism and Market Insulation
However, if network effects lead to standardization, what then
may account for the persistence of polycentrism? Why is there not a

136.
See Druzin, supra note 130, at 134 (claiming choice of forum decisions fall
under similar network effects as consumer product decisions).
137.
Id. at 135.
138.
See id. at 137-38 ("[A]ll the elements of the modern law merchant ... may
be attributed to the effects of network externalities.").
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single, perfectly unified system of commercial legal order? Why are
there islands of polycentrism? Again, the answer is structural: it is a
result of market insulation. As areas of trade become more
interconnected, network effects will produce more standardization; if
interconnectivity is low, network effects will not manifest as
powerfully. The impact of a network effect ends precisely where the
need for compatibility ends. Put simply, if one never leaves the small
town in which one lives then one only needs to learn the language of
that small town.
1.

The Concept of Network Insulation

To understand what is meant here by of "insulation," it may be
useful to simply think of networks of actors linked together by
trade-whether on the microlevel of private parties or the macrolevel
of states-simply as "trading networks." For example, the global
shipping industry or oil industry is a trading network. Yet these are
hardly hermetically sealed, discrete networks. Rather, upon closer
inspection, the image of a single, unified commercial community
dissolves into a loose amalgam of separate but overlapping nested
networks of commercial association. The coal industry, for example,
spills out into and is interconnected with a dizzying array of other
trading networks. What defines the coal industry is merely a
concentration of trading connections (interconnectivity) between
commercial entities centered loosely around the production and/or
trade of coal. As a trading network, the coal industry sits somewhere
upon a continuum of interconnectivity, varying profoundly depending
upon which section of the industry is being inspected. In truth, it is
an amalgam of countless overlapping, nested, and interconnected
subnetworks with differing degrees of connectivity. Indeed, to
properly understand network effects, the standard notion of a discrete
"market" must be replaced with a more fluid concept, one based upon
the intensity of trading links. While economists may speak in terms
of various markets, on a more abstract, conceptual level, the entire
global economy may be said to be a single market in that it is
interconnected. It is a single market marked by clusters of intense
interconnection based around certain products or services (also
shaped by geographical and national boundaries, protectionist walls,
tariffs, etc.). The extent to which it is possible to speak of separate
markets depends only upon the degree that parts of this single
market suffer from low interconnectivity. Thus, for a trading network
to be insulated, it is not necessary that it is totally disconnected from
all other trading networks (indeed, markets do not exist in this
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manner) just that it possesses relatively less overlap with other
trading networks.' 3 9
2.

Localized Network Effects

It is not normally useful to speak of markets in this highly
structuralist manner. So why do so here? This conceptualization is
important because the degree of interconnectivity between trading
networks, and thus the need for compatible standards arising in
relation to this, will determine the comprehensiveness of
standardization. The less interconnected a trading network is with
other trading networks, the more it is insulated, and thus the less
susceptible it is to the impact of large-scale network effects and
standardization. A sufficiently insulated trading network will
generate its own network effect, much like the dialect of an isolated
community.140
Within
insulated
trading
networks,
the
standardization of certain legal structures will remain localized while
a greater standardization of more general practices will result.141
This results in localized network effects, which account for
polycentrism in relation to legal standards. It is important to clarify
what is meant here by markets, as in the housing market, credit
market, and so on. While network effects may be highly discrete, the
concept of a market is not. Given sufficient interconnection,
standardization will occur across markets. The relative insulation of a
trading network will determine its susceptibility to network effects
and its tendency to maintain localized standards. Therefore, as long
as some trading networks enjoy relatively robust insulation,

139.
It is possible that a market could be completely insulated. Yet, one would
be hard-pressed to find many examples of perfectly isolated markets in human history.
Certainly, an example would be virtually impossible to find in the modern age. For
example, even the most isolated farming community in North Korea, the hermit
kingdom, enjoys some degree of connectivity: that is, to the larger North Korean
economy, which itself, although insulated, is nevertheless connected to the world
economy. And so the story goes for virtually every commercial community across the
globe. The embrace of the market now reaches across the planet. Perhaps a good
analogy is that of an ecosystem: while ostensibly discrete and largely insulated, it is
merely embedded into the larger environment.
140.
It is not a coincidence, for example, that while there is a single worldwide
standard for fax machines and modems where compatibility between regions is its
express purpose, multiple formats persist for digital televisions, for which compatibility
across regions is not a key element. See Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varion, The Art of
Standards War, 41 CAL. MGMT. REV. 8, 13 (1999) (arguing that where compatibility
across regions is not a necessity, such as in the digital television market, multiple
formats can coexist, unlike the standard needed across things such as fax machines).
141.
See id. at 9-10 (illustrating the difficulties encountered when developing
intercontinental railroads because of different track gauges, which worked in localized
areas but necessarily yielded to a standard when travel was no longer isolated to local
areas).
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polycentrism will persist on certain levels. Polycentrism is in fact
localized network effects.
The medieval Law Merchant once more illustrates the point:
while regional differences between various Law Merchant courts
remained, there emerged a relatively consistent body of law across
vast stretches of Europe created by trade links.142 Although regions
had their "own variety of the Law Merchant . . .

,

all were but

varieties of the same species. Everywhere the leading principles and
the most important rules were the same, or tended to become the
same." 143 This is rather astonishing considering the impoverished
level of communication and regionalized character of the age.
Network effects help explain how the Law Merchant displayed this
degree of uniformity in the face of polycentrism; the interaction of
traveling traders generated network effects that caused merchants
across vast regions to converge on specific legal standards in an
entirely uncoordinated fashion. This legal standardization was
something comparable to the standardization of railway track gauges
in the nineteenth century-it provided a standard upon which the
enterprise could flourish.144 More importantly, network effects
continue to exert a similar influence over the emergence of the
modern Law Merchant. This is a powerful idea: it strongly predicts
that a global commercial legal order is a virtual inevitability (albeit
with pockets of polycentrism). The only obstacles now to global
standardization are (1) national laws that serve as de facto barriers to
legal standards and (2) the natural insulation of certain trading
networks.
The application of network effects to legal standardization brings
up several very interesting implications that are beyond the scope of
this Article-concepts such as switching costs, lock-in, and potential
inefficiencies, which may offer considerable explanatory power
regarding how international legal structures are evolving, and will
continue to evolve. 14 5 Moreover, the idea that network effects may

142.

See W. MITCHELL,

AN

ESSAY ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW

MERCHANT 7, 9 (1904) (concluding the differences across regional trade laws were still
based upon the same broad foundation).
Id.
143.
144.
For more on the spontaneous emergence of standards as the result of
network effects, specifically in relation to choice of law and choice of forum clauses in
transnational contracts, see Druzin, supra note 130, at 170-72. See also Douglas J.
Puffert, Path Dependence in Spatial Networks: The Standardizationof Railway Track
Gauge, 39 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 282, 283 (2002) (illustrating how the
standardization of track gauges led to greater profits for railways due to increased
ability to exchange traffic).
145.
For the foundational literature on how a user can become "locked-in" to a
product because the costs associated with switching are too high, see Stan Liebowitz &
Stephen E. Margolis, Policy and Path Dependence: From QWERTY to Windows 95, 3
CATO REV. Bus. & GOV'T 33, 33 (1995); W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies,
supra note 133, at 119 (depicting how multiple choices to continue using inferior
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induce the autonomous standardization of legal structures may be a
substantial contribution to the literature on bottom-up legal
ordering. 146 In any case, for the purposes of this Article, the
importance of network effects is clear: once a degree of legal
standardization takes root, the phenomenon can swiftly reinforce
itself as network externalities amplify the effects. As customary
methods of conducting business become more deeply entrenched and
widely followed, the system becomes progressively easier to maintain
and the process more difficult to reverse. In simple terms, the
further
encourages
only
of
standardization
emergence
standardization.

V. OTHER MECHANISMS
Thus far, the discussion has concentrated on three primary
mechanisms that help drive the emergence of a global commercial
legal order: reciprocity, market pressures, and network effects.
Reciprocity encourages compliance in the absence of a centralized
authority, market demands produce a generally similar body of law,
and network effects tend to iron out polycentrism and generate
standardization in that body of law. In short, the market creates legal
order, network effects standardize it, and reciprocity sustains it.
However, there are other mechanisms worth noting that, arguably,
also play a role in inducing the decentralized emergence of
commercial legal order. The final Part of this Article summarizes the
more significant of these. What follows is a laundry list of sorts-a
selection of various features of trade that contribute to the emergence
of a relatively standardized, global commercial legal order. Many of
these mechanisms are deserving of a far richer discussion than is
provided here. Further examination along these lines is invited,
particularly where this may be of an empirical nature.
A. TransregionalNature
Foremost among these features is the simple fact that commerce
has an inherent tendency toward interregionalization. Indeed, it is
the very nature of commerce to encourage and foster links between
regions of people to anticipate convergence. Law of a noncommercial
technology can make it too expensive to switch and will lock users in to the inferior
technology); Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 123.
146.
This is something I hope to unpack more fully in future research. For more
on what I have written on the idea of bottom-up legal ordering, see Bryan H. Druzin,
PlantingSeeds of Order: How the State Can Create, Shape, and Use Customary Law,
27 BYU J. PUB. L. 373 (2014) (forthcoming) (arguing that policymakers can harness the
energy of customary ordering to trigger legal order); Druzin, supra note 33 (arguing
that treaties may be intentionally designed to capture the dynamic that gives rise to
cooperative order).
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nature has no need for harmonization, as there is no inherent
collision between these bodies of law. This is not the case with law of
commercial nature. Commercial activity is the forging of ties between
people, an evolving process of interaction and reciprocity-with its
rise comes the need for relatively standardized legal regulation. As
commerce flows across regional divides, commercial legal order flows
with it; it is the extension of an evolving system of transregional
connections, pushing law across geographical and cultural
boundaries.
This is not true for other forms of law. To pick but one example,
family law is not inherently interregional. It is quite content to be
entirely regionalized. Commerce is not. As merchants engage in trade
across political, cultural, and geographic divides, they transport trade
practices and the law that supports it. As commercial activity from
disparate regions commingles, standardization is entrenched by a
sort of natural "ripple" effect between regions, creating a degree of
legal uniformity. This ripple effect may be particularly powerful for
the commercial law of an economically dominant region relative to
less commercially significant regions. Less commercially vibrant
regions are more likely to be more inclined to adopt the commercial
practices of the more dominant regions. This is generally comparable
to the linguistic dominance of the English language as a common
tongue (indeed, English has now become the undisputed language of
international business).14 7 The upshot of all this is an overall
standardization in commercial practices and the law that goes with it.
B. A Commercial Veil of Ignorance
There are other features that likely also play an important role
in the global emergence of a transnational commercial legal order.
Commercial relationships are generally fluid, with traders frequently
changing roles as sellers and buyers, reversing the duties that arise

147.
This is intimately related to the idea of network effects and economies of
scale, discussed below. See Mark Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of
Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REv. 479, 494 (1998) ("Language, for example,
is the fundamental medium of communication and could be said to have both negligible
inherent value to the first speaker and increasing value over the range of additional
speakers."); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: Uncommon
Tragedy, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 136 (1994) (citing the proliferation of English speakers
as creating a network of relationships, even where there may be no physical
interaction); Amitai Aviram, A Network Effects Analysis of Private Ordering 15
(Berkeley Program L. & Econ. Working Paper Series No. 46, 2003), available at
http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0n7132w5#page-1 ("Language is characterized by
network effects-the benefit derived from communicating in a language increases
significantly as more people are familiar with it."). For a more in-depth analysis of the
network effects of language, see generally Jeffrey Church & Ian King, Bilingualism
and Network Externalities,26 CAN. J. ECON. 337 (1993).
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out of these commercial exchanges.' 4 8 This has a direct effect upon
compliance. This fluidity, so characteristic of commercial intercourse,
creates a "Rawlsian veil of ignorance"149 in which actors are more
willing to observe the collectively agreed-upon set of rules because it
is in their self-interest to do so. This is because their position in
relation to these sets of rules is subject to change. Indeed, this was
the case "during the formative period of the medieval Law
Merchant ... when traveling merchants acted in the dual capacity of
buyer and seller. If they articulated a rule of law which was favorable
to them as sellers, it could have the opposite effect when they acted as
buyers, and vice versa."15 0
This is equally true on the macrolevel of the state. States engage
in trade as both importer and exporter, as both buyer and seller.
Moreover, state economies typically span diverse sectors that
experience different periods of growth and decline. The uncertainty of
future economic conditions in relation to the various sectors of their
economy, and the duality of their role as both importer and exporter,
places governments behind a similar "veil of ignorance." Entire
national economies experience a shifting relationship with the rules
of commercial law. In some instances, governments may be
advantaged by a rule that in fact works to their detriment in other
sectors-or when they assume the role of importer instead of
exporter. States are highly reluctant to engage in noncompliance
where a trade war may result (negative reciprocity), yet they are
equally hesitant to violate rules of trade that may benefit them in
other circumstances (positive reciprocity). This undoubtedly plays a
role in voluntary compliance with international commercial
agreements in the absence of truly efficacious enforcement
mechanisms.

148.
This was already touched on in relation to Fuller's notion of duty. For a
detailed discussion of the role of stochastic symmetry and role reversibility in inducing
spontaneous systems of order, see Francesco Parisi, Spontaneous Emergence of Law:
Customary Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 603, 607-08 (Boudewijn
Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
149.
Rawls claims that rational people will choose to follow principles of justice,
which are innately fair, if their reasoning is conducted from a position of uncertainty
regarding how the selected principles will affect their own personal situation. Rawls
refers to this process of reasoning without personal biases as "the Veil of Ignorance." In
his seminal work, A Theory of Justice, Rawls states, "I assume the parties are situated
behind a veil of ignorance. They do not know how the various alternatives will affect
their own particular case and they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis
of general consideration." JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118 (rev. ed., 1999).
150.
Parisi, supra note 148, at 608.
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C. Universal Nature
Another contributing characteristic of trade is the universal and
(mostly) culturally neutral nature of trade. Commercial legal order is
generally less rooted to specific political and cultural traditions,
displaying a more universal character. This greatly facilitates
standardization across regions. Such is not the case with
noncommercial areas of law. With areas of noncommercial law-such
as family law, constitutional law, administrative law, the rules of civil
procedure, human rights, and criminal law-the influence of
particular cultural and religious values looms larger and impedes
interregional standardization. Thus, commercial legal order-being
relatively apolitical, non-normative, and less influenced by the winds
of cultural subjectivity-tends to display a more homogeneous
appearance than many other forms of law. As commercial forces tend
to be universal, so too are their legal expression, and this is conducive
to the global expansion of these legal structures. People are far more
inclined to adopt new, foreign commercial legal practices than they
are noncommercial legal principles that are tied up with more
normatively loaded arenas such as criminal law, tort law, and family
law. Indeed, as has been discussed previously in the literature, a
rational choice model applies more readily to merchant
communities.1 5 1 Commercial arrangements are markedly nonnormative. "[I]n commercial interactions, parties are far more likely
to be calculating their actions according to parameters of self-interest,
and are therefore less likely to be guided by emotional considerations
....
"152 The clarity that arises from commercial relationships thus
allows for an easier adoption of new legal practices, which facilitates
standardization.
D. Ease of Consensus and Immediate Legitimacy
Another point is the ease of consensus surrounding law of a
commercial nature. The tangible nature of commercial activity, where
loss and gain is more immediate and quantifiable, facilitates legal
standardization to a greater degree than other forms of law. This is
because it is easier to achieve agreement between states regarding
commercial regulation-where costs and benefits can be more easily
anticipated-than to reach consensus regarding abstract issues such
as constitutional freedoms and human rights. Due to this built-in
characteristic, commercial legal order lends itself more readily to
transnational emergence. The emergence of EU law, from what was

151.

For a more detailed exposition of this point, see Druzin, supra note 5, at

152.

Id.

570.
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in its nascent stages no more than a succession of commercial
agreements, is perhaps a perfect illustration of this point.
Related to the ease of consensus is the issue of legitimacy.
Burgeoning transregional commercial legal order is substantially
legitimized by the usefulness and efficiency of concrete, issue-specific
commercial cooperation and its outcomes. Of course, this is not a
seamless evolution. Consider the WTO. In the context of the WTO,
consensus is often extremely difficult to achieve. Likewise, the
legitimacy of the WTO remains constantly under challenge. 5 3
Nevertheless, economic goals tightly bound in well-established
commercial regulation provide a sense of legitimacy that is hard to
achieve as rapidly (if at all) in other areas of law. Regarding law of a
noncommercial nature, the acceptance of the primacy of
noncommercial law over preexisting regional law is far more
challenging, as noncommercial law does not enjoy the advantage of an
almost-instant overarching sense of common purpose (i.e., economic
benefit). This is a profoundly powerful legitimizing force. While such
recognition can take considerable periods of time-as well as
significant historical and political events-to become wellestablished, the uniting force of common commercial interests can
achieve this remarkably quickly. The sense of legitimacy to
commercial law is arguably significant to its evolution on an
interstate level, reinforcing and fostering its continued emergence.
E. Modeling and the Element of Competition

There is a final feature implicit to trade that should be
considered. In fact, this is the foundational paradigm to trade:
competition. Commercial legal order arises from a system (commerce)
wholly predicated upon competition. This is not the case for other
forms of law, such as criminal law. As a result, successful commercial
practices tend to self-replicate across regions as players model their
own commercial enterprises on prior successful ones-if only to
remain competitive. Precisely because they facilitate commerce,
successful legal structures will frequently be adopted across regions
much in the same way.154 In order to remain competitive, merchants
are often forced to implement commercial practices that have proven
most functionally efficient. This basic element of competition thus
encourages "modeling," which further induces standardization. Once
these legal structures emerge, competition ensures continued

153.

See Amrita Narlikar, Law and Legitimacy: The World Trade Organization,

in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 294-97 (David Armstrong ed., 2009)

(detailing the most popular arguments against the legitimacy of the WTO).
154.
See TRAKMAN, supra note 53, at 71 (concluding only those legal structures
that prevailed in trade practice will be implemented over those created by common law
judges because of the former's proven success).
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adherence to the rules that develop. The force of competition will lock
them into place. Thus, the same dynamic that initially gives rise to
legal standardization also sustains it; no party will risk abandoning
commercial legal practices that have proven efficient. This dynamic is
absent in the realm of noncommercial legal order, where competition
simply does not apply.
While there is an implicit tendency for commercial legal order to
follow a pattern of spontaneous standardization, this is simply not
the case for most noncommercial legal order. Areas of law such as
administrative law, constitutional law, and criminal law do not have
comparative mechanisms that drive standardization and compliance
to a comparable degree. This is why, arguably, the structures of
commercial legal order have advanced more swiftly in a transnational
context than law of a noncommercial nature. And this is as true for
the medieval Law Merchant as it is for the modern Law Merchant. It
is the nature of commercial regulation to induce standardization,
which is not the case for noncommercial areas of legal order. Again,
the European Union provides a good example. Indeed, the enormous
difficulty and repeated setbacks beleaguering EU legal integration as
it seeks to establish an extensive legal framework beyond the scope of
mere commerce is testament to the complexity involved in this more
ambitious form of legal integration. Achieving this level of
transnational standardization is difficult precisely because these
areas of noncommercial legal order lack the mechanisms implicit in
commerce discussed in this Article. These mechanisms naturally
encourage standardization and facilitate convergence. A tremendous
act of political and cultural will is therefore required to push past this
barrier and scale the towering cliffs of total legal integration.

VI. CONCLUSION

This Article argued that the emergence of a global commercial
legal order may be partially attributed to the unique structural
nature of trade-it put forth a structuralist account of this
emergence. Unlike legal order of a noncommercial nature, commercial
legal order has built-in mechanisms that make it well-suited to evolve
in a transnational context. The Article mapped out the principal
mechanisms that support and drive this process forward: reciprocity,
the market, and network effects. The role of network effects in
decentralized legal ordering in particular offers a wide breadth of
theoretical potential. The Article also noted other features implicit in
trade that arguably also play a role in the emergence of a global
commercial law. Commercial legal order is a wholly unique form of
law in that its mechanics are intertwined with a basic activity that
undergirds and flows throughout the development of human
civilization-trade. As such, it possesses intrinsic features not found
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in any other quarters of law. The ever-widening gulf between global
commercial and non-commercial law is testament to the ability of
these features to propel the transnational emergence of a commercial
legal order. The implications of this are far-reaching: it suggests that,
because commercial legal order is uniquely predisposed to evolve
without the state, there is every reason to believe that this
asymmetrical emergence will not only continue, but likely grow even
more extreme as time passes and global trade increases. The world
may very soon see a virtually unified system of global commercial
legal order, while legal order of a non-commercial nature remains
languishing in the deep mud of entrenched regionalism. It may be
that, absent a central authority with real legislative and enforcement
power, legal order of a noncommercial nature simply lacks the
structural ability to ever achieve global unity. As the volume of
international trade continues to increase swiftly and unabated-now
including in its expansive sweep virtually every corner of the globethis possibility is a reality for which the international community
would be well-advised to prepare.

